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Winners and Losers of Trade Barriers
Introduction
The United States has a huge trade account deficit—$753 billion in 
2016. President Trump has asserted that a more restrictive trade policy 
which involves tariffs and quotas would help to achieve his goal of 
boosting U.S. economic growth to 3-plus per cent. On March 1, 2018, 
Mr. Trump announced unexpectedly that the U.S. would impose tariffs 
of 25 percent on steel imports and 10 percent on aluminum. He later 
twitted that “When a country (USA) is losing many billions of dollars 
on trade with virtually every country it does business with, trade wars 
are good, and easy to win.” The World Trade Organization (TWO) 
immediately issued a rare warning about Trump’s plan saying it risks a 
trade war. Do tariffs promote or hurt economic growth? This poster 
tries to shed some lights on this important question from both 
theoretical and empirical perspectives. If tariff-growth relationship is 
neutral or negative, then what are the consequences on income 
distribution—i.e., who are the winners and who are the losers?
Table 2
Tariff Rates in Selected 
Countries and the World
This period also witnessed the 
rapid economic takeoffs of four 
Asian tigers (South Korea, 
Taiwan, Hong Kong, and 
Singapore) and, more recently, 
of China and India. 
Never before in human history 
have so many people 
experienced such a rapid rise in 
their living standards as billions 
of people are lifted off poverty. 
Data Source: World Bank
Table 1 
World Merchandise 
Exports and Shares of Top 
Three Exporters
Data Source: WTO World Trade 
Statistics Review 2017
Importance of Trade to Economic Growth: A 
Historical Perspective
Impacts of Tariffs on Economic Growth
Contrary to the popular belief, the economic analysis of international 
trade does not assume that free trade is good for everyone. It is well 
understood that increased trade and openness can shift the 
distribution of income within countries and create losers as well as 
winners. 
Autor, Dorn and Hanson (2016) argued that the rapid growth of 
Chinese exports after 1990, and especially after 2001, when China 
joined the WTO, created much more hardship in the United States 
than most economists had realized. They estimated that this “China 
shock” displaced, in total, around 1 million U.S. manufacturing jobs. 
Moreover, these job losses were concentrated in a relatively small 
number of regions and led to further job losses in those regions as 
demand for local services fell. This backdrop may partly explain the 
backlash against globalization that was visible in 2016, when Britain 
voted to leave the European Union and the United State elected a 
president with a strong protectionist bias; it also explains President 
Trump’s recent announcement to impose tariffs on imported steel and 
aluminum.  
Overall, tariffs are negative (or neutral at best) to economic growth. 
In the short run the US government might get more tax revenue; 
American steel and aluminum manufacturers will benefit from 
repressed foreign competition. But the biggest losers are the U.S. 
consumers. Studies have shown that tariffs likely impose a heavier 
burden on poor and middle-class Americans, as these households 
generally spend more on traded goods as a share of 
expenditure/income. 
The first age of globalization (from early 19th century to 1913)
Classical economists from Adam Smith to David Richado were 
among the adamant advocators for free trade. However, it was not 
until the early 19th century that a major turning point for world 
trade began to take hold. The arrival of the industrial revolution in 
the early 1800s finally triggered the massive expansion of trade, 
capital and technology flows across borders, introducing the first 
age of globalization. Along with the industrial revolution came 
steam power, the opening of the Suez Canal, railways, and 
electronic telegraphs. As a result, international trade increased 
rapidly after 1820. By 1913, the share of world exports in world 
GDP reached 7.9%, just before the First World War, a level which 
was not surpassed until the 1960s.
Re-globalization (end of WWII to present)
After the disruptions of the two world wars, the world economy has 
undergone a process of re-globalization. The world economy grew 
faster between 1950 and 1973 than it had done before 1913. This 
economic growth was accompanied by even higher growth in trade 
(see Table 1). International trade flows have increased dramatically 
over the last three decades. According to WTO trade statistics, the 
value of world merchandise exports rose from US$1.84 trillion in 
1983 to US$15.5 trillion in 2016, which is equivalent to 7 per cent 
growth per year in current dollar terms.
Year World 
($ 
billion)
China
(%)
US
(%)
Germa
ny
(%)
1948 59 0.9 21.6 1.4
1953 84 1.2 14.6 5.3
1963 157 1.3 14.3 9.3
1973 579 1.0 12.2 11.7
1983 1839 1.2 11.2 9.2
1993 3,688 2,5 12.6 10.3
2003 7,380 5.9 9.8 10.2
2016 15,464 13.6 9.4 8.7
Many factors may have contributed to this remarkable expansion of 
international trade. One of them is the significant reduction in trade 
barriers, which include transportation costs and policy barriers 
(tariffs and non-tariff barriers). 
Beginning in the mid-1980s, a number of developing countries 
moved to lower tariff rates and removed import quotas and other 
restrictions on trade. Today, the average tariff rate in the world is 
below 7%. The tariff rates for the developing countries have fallen 
from an average of more than 30% in the early 1980s to only about 
10% today. In comparison, the tariff rate for the U.S. is around 3%, 
on par with other OECD countries (see Table 2). 
Trade Barriers Have Fallen Significantly
Year China OECD U.S. World
1996 22.02 5.2 4.11 9.74
1997 16.66 5.66 4.16 10.79
1998 16.64 5.05 4.1 10.51
1999 16.34 5.68 3.68 10.19
2000 16.4 4.91 3.62 10.13
2001 15.39 5.1 3.55 9.68
2002 11.81 4.8 3.68 9.37
2003 10.69 4.84 3.32 8.27
2004 9.81 4.42 3.13 8.27
2005 9.24 3.8 3.07 8.01
2006 8.88 4.16 2.98 7.34
2007 8.79 3.68 2.83 7.05
2008 8.57 3.52 2.96 7.13
2009 8.07 3.68 2.87 6.9
2010 7.92 3.16 2.84 6.18
2011 7.82 2.95
2012 3.19 2.93 6.8
2013 2.83
2014 7.57 2.89
2015 7.55 2.79
2016 7.76 2.79
The main argument for a positive tariff-growth relationship is the 
Laursen-Metzler (1950) effect which posits that tariffs improve the 
terms of trade to affect saving positively. However, Obstfeld (1982) 
showed that theoretical support for the existence of a Laursen-
Metzler effect is fragile. In addition, empirical studies offer mixed 
results, with some studies rejecting the hypothesis of such an effect. 
In the short run, in the absence of the Laursen-Metzler effect, the 
impact of trade restrictions on output is exactly offset by induced 
currency appreciation, leaving the relative price of domestic- and 
foreign-produced goods and, with it, output and employment 
unchanged.
For the long run, there is a stronger consensus among economists 
about the effects of external openness. That is, trade openness or free 
trade is positive for economic growth, while financial openness is 
more of a mixed blessing, in emerging markets and developing 
countries in particular, one should be embraced only when a country 
has reached a critical or threshold level of financial and institutional 
development (Largade, 2017) . 
